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CASE NOTES
define the requirement allows the court in the future to impose a high
threshold of impairment before finding the defects constitute substan-
tial impairment in a given situation.
If the court had this in mind, the elevation of the substantial impair-
ment requirement is unfortunate. Under such a standard, fewer buyers
may be able to revoke in the future because of their inability to establish
the existence of both major and minor defects in the defective product.
On the other hand, the likelihood that more than a handful of buyers
will be denied a remedy due to the insolvency of the immediate dealer
is minimal. Therefore, maintenance of the privity requirement might
have been less inequitable than increasing the threshold of substantial
impairment.
The impact of the Durfee decision on future attempts by buyers to
revoke acceptance under section 2-608 of the U.C.C. is uncertain. The
decision of the Minnesota court to disregard the privity requirement, at
least when the immediate seller of the defective product is insolvent, is
a reasoned one that does no more than rightfully assure consumers that
they will not be unjustifiably burdened with defective products. By its
decision, the court also recognizes the nature of the relationship between
sellers and other parties higher in the sales chain of distribution and
places the risk of loss from a defective product on those parties-be they
distributors or manufacturers-who benefit, rather than upon innocent
buyers. But the court' should set forth a standard of what is necessary
to establish substantial impairment. Doing so will benefit buyers and
sellers alike, as well as the Minnesota trial courts, all of whom must
struggle with the application of the substantial impairment requirement
until the supreme court finally resolves the issue. When the court is
afforded the opportunity, it should reach a decision that recognizes the
practical reality that products requiring constant repair are essentially
worthless to the consumer.
Criminal Law-GUIDELINES ADOPTED CONCERNING JOINT ]REPRESENTA-
TION OF MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS-State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn.
1977).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has long expressed disfavor with the
practice of a single attorney representing multiple defendants in a crimi-
nal proceeding.' The basis for this view is the strong possibility of a
constitute substantial impairment; however, in combination with the frequent stalling of
the Saab, plaintiff has shown substantial impairment." 262 N.W.2d at 354 (emphasis
added). See notes 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
1. See, e.g., State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. 1977); State v. Taylor, 305 Minn.
558, 561, 234 N.W.2d 586, 588 (1975) (per curiam) (reiterating strong disapproval of joint
1
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conflict of interest arising,' coupled with the consequent diminished
effectiveness of each defendant's legal representation.' Deprivation of
"effective" assistance of counsel is recognized as a violation of both the
United States' and Minnesota5 constitutions. In State v. Olsen," the
Minnesota court commented again on the issue of joint representation
of multiple criminal defendants and, in forceful language, adopted stan-
dards designed to protect the constitutional right of jointly represented
codefendants to fair and effective counsel.
In Olsen, the defendants, Olsen and Kassube, were tried jointly by a
jury and convicted of aggravated arson and conspiracy to commit arson.'
Both defendants were represented by the same attorney." Following de-
representation); State v, Wilson, 294 Minn. 501, 502, 200 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1972) (per
curiam) (indicating "strong disapproval of dual representation"); State v. Robinson, 271
Minn. 477, 481,136 N.W.2d 401, 405 (better practice to appoint separate counsel for each
defendant in a joint trial), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965).
2. When one attorney represents the interests of two or more codefendants, their inter-
ests may become "conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant," according
to MINNESOTA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14. One commentator has re-
marked:
[Tihe attorney is placed in the untenable position of having to divide his
loyalties between the competing interests of his clients. In such situations one
or all of the clients may suffer because the judgment of the lawyer with regard
to one client may not be in the best interests of the other.
Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court's
Headache, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 315 (1977).
3. See notes 27-30 infra and accompanying text. Conflict and resulting diminished
effectiveness of counsel can occur at any time in the criminal proceeding. See Geer,
Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Profes-
sional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119, 125-40 (1978).
4. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that "[iln
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court decided that this
provision contemplates "effective" assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
5. Although the Minnesota Constitution includes a representation clause analogous to
that of the United States Constitution, compare MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6 with U.S. CONST.
amend. VI, the Minnesota Supreme Court has relied instead on the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and article one, section seven of the Minnesota
Constitution as authority for the proposition that the Minnesota criminal defendant's
right to counsel contemplates "effective" counsel. See State v. Fields, 279 Minn. 374, 377,
157 N.W.2d 61, 63 (1968) ("effective" assistance of counsel mandated by fourteenth
amendment); State v. Waldron, 273 Minn. 57,65,139 N.W.2d 785, 792 (1966) (due process
contemplates effective assistance of counsel).
6. 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. 1977).
7. Id. at 900. Kassube conspired with Olsen to set fire to Kassube's home in order to
collect on an insurance policy. Olsen's accomplice, Gerald Johnson, died while attempting
to set the house on fire. Id.
8. See id. at 904. The court in Olsen does not mention whether counsel was appointed
or retained, although because of the paramount nature of the rights involved, probably
no distinction should be made. See, e.g., United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 101 (8th
Cir. 1977) (applying rule equally to both appointed and retained counsel), cert. denied,
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nial by the trial court of Olsen's petition for post-conviction relief,"
Olsen appealed"' and the supreme court reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial. Olsen's conviction was reversed because the trial court
had failed to comply with the then pertinent statute," which required
separate trials for two or more codefendants unless a joint trial was
ordered by the trial court upon written motion by the prosecution. 2 The
prosecution had failed to make a written motion for joint trial, a failure
viewed by the supreme court as reversible error. 3 This error was com-
pounded by the failure of the trial court to instruct Olsen of his right to
a separate trial until the second day of the trial, which deprived him of
the ability to meaningfully waive this right." Although the basis for the
435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1975) (same
standard of prejudice applies to retained counsel), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976); Lollar
v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (risk and disabilities inherent in joint
representation present whether counsel appointed or retained). However, a distinction
between retained and appointed counsel might have significance. See United States v.
Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1406 (5th Cir. 1976) (court's disposition of the case made it
unnecessary to consider what represented a waiver of the right to effective assistance of
counsel in the context of joint representation by retained counsel), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
929 (1977); Foxworth v. Wainright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1076 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Joint repre-
sentation by retained counsel is a different question entirely.").
9. 258 N.W.2d at 900. At the end of trial, Olsen moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and a new trial, Upon denial of this motion by the trial court, Olsen appealed.
The supreme court remanded the case for post-conviction proceedings. These proceedings
concerned alleged recantation of testimony by a witness for the state. See id. at 903.
10. Four separate grounds for reversal were presented by Olsen. The supreme court
rejected his first three arguments on the following grounds: first, the evidence was suffi-
cient to sustain the verdict; second, Olsen was not denied due process of law on account
of a reference to codefendant made by the trial court to the jury because Olsen made no
timely objection; and third, a new trial was not wairanted on the basis of recanted testi-
mony because the recantation was not sufficient to constitute error. See id. at 901-03.
11. The statute provided:
When two or more defendants shall be jointly indicted or informed against for
a felony, they shall be tried separately, provided, however, upon written motion,
the court, in the interest of justice and not related to time or economy may order
joint trial for any two or more said defendants. In cases other than felonies,
defendants jointly indicted or informed against may be tried jointly or sepa-
rately, in the discretion of the court. In all cases any one or more of said defen-
dants may be convicted or acquitted.
Act of May 27, 1969, ch. 801, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1477 (superseded by MINN. R. CrIM.
P. 17.03, subd. 2(1)).
12. See 258 N.W.2d at 904. Prior to 1969, the statute read in part as follows: "When
two or more defendants shall be jointly indicted for a felony, any defendant who shall
require it shall be tried separately." Revised Laws of Minn. § 5360 (1904). This language
was interpreted as giving the defendant an absolute right to a separate trial. See, e.g.,
State v. Robinson, 271 Minn. 477, 136 N.W.2d 401, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965); State
v. Martineau, 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410 (1960).
13. See 258 N.W.2d at 903.
14. See id. The right to separate trial in Minnesota may be waived under certain
circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Duncan, - Minn. - , , 250 N.W.2d 189, 198
(1977) (consent of defendant to joint trial); State v. Bergland, 294 Minn. 558, 559, 202
19791
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reversal in Olsen was the error committed by the trial court in applying
the separate trial statute, the related issue of joint representation of
criminal defendants by the same counsel also was considered by the
supreme court.1
5
Joint representation of criminal codefendants by the same attorney
has long been viewed as constituting a possible violation of the criminal
defendant's sixth amendment right to fair and effective counsel. This
view was first espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Glasser
v. United States," in which the Court, focusing on the threat of conflicts
of interest arising from joint representation, 7 interpreted the sixth
amendment right to mean assistance "untrammeled and unimpaired"
by conflicting duties and loyalties."' Although courts generally have en-
dorsed the Glasser view that the sixth amendment might be violated by
joint representation of criminal defendants, they have differed in their
approach to appeals based on such claims."' In Minnesota prior to Olsen,
a defendant was required to establish actual prejudice in order to sus-
tain a claim of a constitutional violation.2" Other courts have held that
conflict alone or the substantial possibility of conflict sufficiently estab-
lishes a sixth amendment violation,2' while yet other courts have re-
N.W.2d 223, 224 (1972) (per curiam) (same). In this case, Olsen, who was not even
informed of his right to separate trial until after his trial had begun, did not have a
meaningful opportunity to consent or object to the joint trial procedure until it was too
late and his rights already had been affected.
One commentator has taken the view that an adequate waiver of the right to separate
trial is impossible because conflicts of interest rarely can be predicted. See Geer, supra
note 3, at 140-41.
15. See 258 N.W.2d at 904-08. That the court's discussion of joint representation was
not essential to its holding in the case is evident from the following language: "On the
basis of the joint-trial procedures, reversal is necessary; however, we feel compelled to
comment, once again, on the final issue raised-the joint representation of co-defendants
by a single attorney . I..." d. at 904.
16. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
17. See id. at 76. The Glasser principle has been embodied in a federal statute that
requires federal courts to "appoint separate counsel for defendants having interests that
cannot properly be represented by the same counsel, or when good cause is shown." 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970). This provision, however, has not been utilized widely. Compare
Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968) (joint representation of defendants
did not violate prior version of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970)), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 964
(1969) with United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1973) (court did not
consider possible violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970)) and United States v. Foster,
469 F.2d. 1 (1st Cir. 1972).
18. See 315 U.S. at 70.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 101 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 969 (1978); United States v. Williams, 429 F.2d 158, 160-61 (8th Cir.) (joint
representation not per se violative of sixth amendment absent conflict of interest between
codefendants), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947 (1970).
20. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 294 Minn. 501, 200 N.W.2d 185 (1972) (per curiam); State
ex rel. Knott v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 305, 161 N.W.2d 617 (1968); State v. Robinson, 271
Minn. 477, 136 N.W.2d 401, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965).
21. See United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1975); United States
I Vol. 5
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quired a showing of demonstrable conflict with potential prejudice be-
fore finding a constitutional violation.22
The Minnesota court in Olsen identified various conflict situations to
which the Glasser standard might apply. ' These include the situations
in which an attorney attempts to represent codefendants with inconsis-
tent pleas, factually inconsistent alibis, conflicting testimony, or differ-
ences in degrees of involvement in the crime allegedly commited.2 ' Addi-
tionally, the conflict also may be present when the attorney is faced with
differing tactical considerations regarding the admission of evidence and
the calling, cross-examining, and impeaching of witnesses, or when dif-
ferent strategical considerations respecting the final summation apply
to each codefendant." Recognizing these considerations, the Olsen court
went beyond Glasser, holding that the sixth amendment may be vio-
lated even in the absence of an actual conflict of interest.26 The court
stated:
The inherent difficulty which faces any attorney who undertakes the
joint representation of codefendants is that he or she must simulta-
neously balance the interests of each defendant against the other. Not
only must the attorney defend against the prosecution, but he or she
must also defend against conflicts between the defendants them-
selves.2 17
When an attorney is faced with such a task, the defendant is denied the
complete attention of the attorney to the advocacy of the defendant's
cause.2" Such a denial is not only constitutionally infirm but is pro-
scribed by American Bar Association standards" and by the Minnesota
Code of Professional Responsibility."
For these reasons, the Minnesota court adopted a procedure, labelled
v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 1967); Hall v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 304, 307, 217 N.W.2d
352, 355 (1974).
22. See Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954).
23. See 258 N.W.2d at 904-05.
24. See id. at 905.
25. Id. For a discussion of conflicts of interest at the various stages of a criminal pro-
ceeding, see Geer, supra note 3, at 125-35; Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 470 (1970).
26. See 258 N.W.2d at 904. See generally Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90
(1978). In Holloway, the Court stated that "in a case of joint representation of conflicting
interests the evil-it bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to
refrain from doing .... " Id. at 490 (emphasis in original).
27. 258 N.W.2d at 904.
28. See Note, Conflict of Interests in Criminal Proceedings, 23 ARK. L. REV. 250, 254
(1969).
29. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY EC 5-15 to -16; id. DR 5-105; ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 14 (The Defense Function § 3.5(b)) (Approved Draft
1971).




et al.: Criminal Law—Guidelines Adopted Concerning Joint Representation o
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the affirmative-inquiry approach, 3' designed to safeguard the criminal
defendant's sixth amendment right to fair and effective counsel by en-
suring that, prior to trial,3 2 the defendant is cognizant of the risks inher-
31. See 258 N.W.2d at 906-08.
The affirmative-inquiry approach adopted by Olsen also has been adopted by other
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972); Lollar v. United
States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73
Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968); People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d
769 (1975). But see, e.g., United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States v. Boudreaux, 502 F.2d 557 (5th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1973). The
Third Circuit has recommended a rule "which assumes prejudice and non-waiver if there
has been no on-the-record inquiry by the court" but has not adopted the requirement. See
United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973).
32. See 258 N.W.2d at 906-07. The Olsen court did not specifically address the question
of when, in the course of the litigation, this procedure should be instituted. In a subse-
quent decision, however, the court indicated that if Olsen had been decided at the time
of the trial from which the instant appeal was taken, the trial court judge would have been
obligated to intervene in the omnibus hearing when a conflict first manifested itself. See
State v. Ray, 273 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. 1978) (conviction by jury of burglary and aggra-
vated assault; counsel represented defendant and alleged codefendant who was never
charged; at omnibus hearing fact of plea reduction offer in exchange for turning state's
evidence revealed; counsel related to trial court that he relayed offer to defendant but
stated that he could not offer counsel in light of conflict of interest arising from his
representation of party against whom state desired defendant to testify; held that Olsen
would have required court to intervene during the omnibus hearing). The exact time or
stage chosen is a matter of importance because a prejudicial conflict of interest can occur
as early as the inception of the attorney-client relationship. See United States v. Lawriw,
568 F.2d 98, 103 n.ll (8th Cir. 1977) (advocating inquiry as soon as possible), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 969 (1978).
Notwithstanding the Olsen court's reference to the "trial" court, see 258 N.W.2d at 907,
or the inference in the Ray decision that the Olsen procedure should not be instituted until
the first manifestation of conflict, see State v. Ray, 273 N.W.2d at 655, the Olsen proce-
dure should be instituted during the codefendants' first appearance before the judicial
system. This appearance is currently governed by rule 5 of the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the Olsen colloquy could be easily incorporated within the warn-
ings and pronouncements of rule 5 because this rule already requires the trial court to
initiate considerable discussion with the defendant concerning such weighty matters as
the right to counsel. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5. Also, such a course of action would not offend
those writers not in favor of Olsen-type protection prior to preliminary matters such as
initial hearings and bail hearings. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 14 (The
Defense Function § 3.5(b)) (Approved Draft 1971) (such a procedure not needed for pre-
liminary matters such as initial hearings and application for bail).
Minnesota criminal defendants are first subjected to the full prosecutorial apparatus
of the state during the rule 5 hearing. Because the sixth amendment guarantees the
defendant "that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution
. . . " United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967), and because the Olsen court has
determined that "effective" assistance of counsel contemplates assistance "untrammelled
and unimpaired" by the requirement that one lawyer simultaneously represent conflicting
interests, see 258 N.W.2d at 904 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942)),
the Olsen procedure should be understood to be triggered at the rule 5 initial hearing.
[Vol. 5
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ent in joint representation. The standard promulgated is based on the
standards of the American Bar Association,: the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in United States v. Garcia," and the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals decision in Lollar v. United States.:" Under the
Olsen standard, the record must clearly indicate that any waiver by the
defendant of his rights respecting separate counsel was made voluntarily
and with full understanding of the consequences."' The trial court must
question each defendant separately and on the record.3 7 Furthermore,
each defendant is to be advised of the dangers of joint representation
and is to have an opportunity to question the trial court on the nature
and consequences of joint representation." When satisfactory inquiry
does not appear on the record, the burden will be on the state to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt that no prejudicial conflict of interest
existed."'
The affirmative-inquiry approach is an alternative to an earlier ap-
proach that was first enunciated in United States v. Mandell. "' The
Mandell approach places the duty of informing the defendant of the
potential dangers of joint representation on the defense counsel, while
cautioning the trial judge to watch for indications of conflict during the
trial." The court in Mandell did not feel that an adequate showing of
33. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 to -16; id. DR 5-105; ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCrION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 14 (The Defense Function § 3.5(b)) (Approved Draft
1971).
34. 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
36. See 258 N.W.2d at 907.
37. See id. & n.16; cf. State v. Nelson, - Minn. 250 N.W.2d 816, 817
(1976) (record indicated that guilty plea was voluntary and informed); State v. Nace, 308
Minn. 170, 171, 241 N.W.2d 101, 102 (1976) (per curiam) (trial court has primary responsi-
bility to elicit testimony attendant to guilty plea); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 (procedure
outlining colloquy required for court to accept a guilty plea).
38. 258 N.W.2d at 907.
39. Id. at 907-08. The Olsen court borrowed this concept of shifting the burden from
Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See id. Shifting the burden is not
a new concept. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972) ("govern-
ment will be required to demonstrate from the record that prejudice to the defendant
was improbable"); United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1056 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing
Foster with approval). Essentially, this is the "harmless error" rule articulated in Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which holds that a constitutional error is harmless
only if the court is able to declare that it is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 368
U.S. at 24. In addition, the Chapman Court held that the beneficiary of the error has the
burden of proving harmlessness. See id. For a discussion of the "harmless error" doc-
trine, see Nordby, The Craft of the Criminal Appeal, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 26-28
(1978).
40. 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
41. See 525 F.2d at 677.
Prior to Olsen the Minnesota court apparently treated the issue of joint representation
in a manner similar to Mandell. Under the earlier Minnesota standard, the trial court was
7
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noncompliance by the Bar with the governing provisions of the canons
of ethics had been made to warrant the adoption of an approach that
placed the burden on the state to ensure that the defendant's constitu-
tional rights were protected.1
2
The affirmative-inquiry approach adopted by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court in Olsen"3 is superior to the Mandell standard for several
reasons. First, although both Olsen and Mandell require some evidence
of conflict before granting a new trial to a defendant," they differ as to
which party has the burden of proof with respect to the existence or
absence of prejudice. The Mandell standard, which assures that ade-
quate disclosure of the perils of joint representation is made to the
defendant by the defense attorney, places the burden of showing preju-
dicial conflict of interest on the defendant.'5 Conversely, the Olsen stan-
dard creates a rebuttable presumption of error when the trial record is
devoid of a valid court-initiated waiver, which the state has the burden
of rebutting.4" Second, Mandell requires review of the trial record to
determine whether conflict existed." Such a review may not, however,
disclose all sixth amendment violations." For example, review of the
trial record will not disclose the defense counsel's strategy in his or her
dual representation of the defendants.'9 The Olsen standard attempts
not required to engage in a waiver inquiry, implying that the disclosure and waiver was
left to the defense attorney, and the defendant had the burden of establishing a prejudicial
conflict of interest resulting from the joint representation. See, e.g., State v. Robinson,
271 Minn. 477, 136 N.W.2d 401, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965).
42. See 525 F.2d at 676-77 (citing United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930, 932-33 (2d
Cir. 1966)). The court further reasoned that a factual finding by the trial court that no
prejudice was likely to occur as the result of joint representation would be especially
burdensome to a defendant appealing a conviction on the ground that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel due to joint representation. See id. at 677. Although the
Mandell court refused to adopt an affirmative-inquiry approach, it did not forbid district
courts within its circuit from doing so. See id.
43. Various jurisdictions have adopted forms of an "affirmative inquiry" standard,
although they may differ from the procedure adopted in Olsen with respect to the timing
of the inquiry. See, e.g., Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (conduct hearing only when conflict arises); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 1972) (exact timing left to trial judge's discretion).
44. The Olsen court did not abandon the requirement of "conflict" when it adopted the
burden-shifting mechanism. This is evident in the following language: "the burden shifts
to the state to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a prejudicial conflict of
interests did not exist." 258 N.W.2d at 907-08 (emphasis added).
45. See 525 F.2d at 677.
46. See 258 N.W.2d at 907-08. Other courts have reached a similar result. See, e.g.,
Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (rebuttable presumption of
prejudicial error where trial record devoid of valid, court-initiated waiver).
47. See 525 F.2d at 677-78.
48. The court in Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967) stated: "Like
the famous tip of the iceberg, the record may not reveal the whole story . I... Id. at 246.
49. A defense counsel's use of contrasting trial tactics or stratagems on behalf of code-
fendants at a joint trial may result in conflicts of interest. For example, unfavorable
I[Vol. 5
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to avoid this problem by obtaining a knowledgeable waiver at the outset
so that review of the record for conflict does not become necessary.
Lastly, the Olsen approach avoids the problem of knowledgeable waiver
of rights respecting separate counsel that can arise if a defendant waives
these rights without fully appreciating the significance of potential con-
flicts."' By providing the supreme court with a trial record replete with
all waiver discussion, review of the waiver is possible.
The adoption of the affirmative-inquiry standard by the Minnesota
court in Olsen properly transfers from the defense counsel to the trial
court the responsibility of protecting the untrained and oftentimes unin-
formed defendant's right to effective counsel. By adopting this stan-
dard, the Minnesota court has stepped into the forefront of this impor-
tant area. The Minnesota criminal defendant's sixth amendment right
to effective counsel is now better protected from the perils of joint repre-
sentation.
Election Law-MINNESOTA BALLOT POSITION STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE
EQUAL PROTECTION-Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
The arrangement of candidates' names on election ballots has tradi-
tionally been the prerogative of state legislatures.' In recent years, how-
references to one defendant may be made in order to promote the image of the other
defendant before the jury, or counsel may decide to allow only one defendant to testify,
leaving a question in the mind of the jury as to why the nontestifying codefendant did
not take the stand. Moreover, counsel may fail to object to certain damaging evidence
because it is favorable to one defendant, or he may unknowingly emphasize one defen-
dant's case to the detriment of the other's defense. Furthermore, different mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and varying degrees of involvement in the crime may lead
counsel to play one defendant against the other.
50. See Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("An individual
defendant is rarely sophisticated enough to evaluate the potential conflicts .... ");
United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D.N.J. 1977) (average defendant unable
to understand fully the effect joint representation may have on trial strategy). See
generally Geer, supra note 3, at 140-42. The jointly represented defendant is not in a
position to evaluate whether his rights will be protected adequately by a single counsel.
For example, a "strong" defendant may thrust his own attorney upon a "weak" codefen-
dant who will accept the joint representation without realizing that he is entitled to the
undivided loyalty of counsel to his own cause. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible for
a defendant to envision, before trial, the myriad circumstances under which a conflict may
arise, because conflicts are at times unforeseeable and often develop during the course of
trial. In addition, defendants usually consent to a waiver in reliance on advice received
from counsel who has represented that no conflicts exist.
1. E.g., Mann v. Powell, 333 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. I1. 1971); see, e.g., Voltaggio
v. Caputo, 210 F. Supp. 337, 338-39 (D.N.J. 1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 232 (1963).
The methods of determining ballot position include:
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